Leslie Dimick
March 11, 2014

Security Survey
Vermont State House
Montpelier, Vermont



By the
United States Secret Service

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
Thomas P. O'Neill Federal Building
10 Causeway Street, Suite 791
Boston, Massachusetts 02222-1080

Vermont State House
115 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05633

Dear Senator Illuzzi,

Reference is made to my telephone conversation with Security Officer David Janawicz in regards to the Vermont State Capital Survey. Enclosed are six copies of the survey for your review. In many instances, the recommendations in the survey represent the ideal situation, and can be useful in providing a standard for the level of security that may be deemed appropriate for the State of Vermont.

As I discussed with Officer Janawicz, myself and/or a representative from the Boston Field Office will be available, at your convenience, to answer any questions you or the committee may have.

In the mean time, please feel free to contact me at my office in San Francisco at telephone number (415)744-9026.

ATSAIC Andrew Orringer

Approved:

SAIC John J. O'Hara

FOREWORD

This report sets forth the findings and recommendations of a protective survey conducted by the U.S. Secret Service, regarding the physical security of the Vermont State House, in Montpelier, Vermont. This survey was conducted during the period of October 21, 1997 through October 24, 1997.

This survey was initiated upon a request from Commissioner Thomas W. Torti, Department of Buildings and General Services, State of Vermont, in a letter dated September 17, 1997. Commissioner Torti advised that the Vermont State House was currently undergoing restoration. This restoration was approximately half way completed at the time this survey was conducted.

Director Lewis C. Merletti authorized this survey, and a team of Secret Service personnel was sent to Montpelier, Vermont to complete the task. This survey was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Michael Johnston, Boston Field Office; Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge, Andrew Orringer, Vermont Domicile; Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge John Heckman, Special Agent Richard Harrington, and Security Specialist Stephanie Gentile, Special Investigations and Security Division; Officer Dale Chandler, USSS Uniformed Division; Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Roger Masone, Physical Security Specialist Mary Raymond, and Physical Security Specialist Gerry Lambert, Technical Security Division; and, Visual Information Specialists Scott Muntz, Ed Bradham and Robert Booth, Forensic Services Division.

The objective and scope of this survey were set forth in a meeting between Senator Vince Illuzzi, Chairman of the Senate Institutions Committee and Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Andrew Orringer of the Burlington, Vermont Domicile. In that meeting Senator Iluzzi stated that in keeping with the historical character of the statehouse, and the openness of the political process of the state legislature, any security enhancements would be minimal. Senator Iluzzi requested that recommended security enhancements be specifically associated with major events held in the capitol building. He further requested that emphasis be placed on the utilization of magnetometers.

The survey's findings are based on an analysis of the existing security afforded the Capitol building. A variety of recommendations are offered, some of which require additional personnel and budgeting for implementation. All recommendations need not be implemented simultaneously to improve security. While many of the recommendations are interrelated, many may be implemented using a step-by-step approach as resources become available.

The successful completion of this survey was made possible through the professional assistance and cooperation afforded the Secret Service by many employees of the State of Vermont. Special acknowledgement is given to Security Officer David Janawicz for his invaluable assistance. The United States Secret Service gratefully acknowledges the contributions made by the many individuals who participated in this endeavor.

INTRODUCTION

This survey was conducted at the State House in Montpelier, Vermont by the United States Secret Service.



The survey's findings are based on an analysis of the existing buildings, grounds, streets, vehicle and pedestrian traffic, and security practices and policies found at the complex. A variety of recommendations are offered, some of which would require additional personnel and budgeting for implementation. All recommendations need not be implemented to improve security. While certain recommendations are interrelated, many may be phased in gradually to provide a level of security that should rise as each incremental stage is reached.

The objective of this survey was to review the security procedures currently in place at the facility and provide recommendations that are intended to enhance the existing security procedures.

There is an understandable reluctance to restrict the access of the general public who wish to observe the state government at work. However, it is the state government's responsibility to provide a safe and secure environment from which to observe this process. Security is affected by a variety of issues. Most security measures are an inconvenience and contain a risk factor that must be taken into account when determining what security measures can or should be implemented. Enhancing security requires the education, cooperation, and participation of those who work and visit the Vermont State House.

GROUNDS AND BUILDINGS

The current state house was completed in 1859, and is located in the city of Montpelier, in Washington County, Vermont. The building is constructed primarily of granite. There were three additions made to the building in 1888, 1900 and 1987.

The building is topped with a gold dome and statue of Agriculture. The dome measures fifty-seven (57) feet in height and is made of wood sheathed in copper and covered with 23.75 carat gold leaf.

The State House is surrounded by Governor Aiken Avenue on the west, Governor Davis Avenue on the east, and State Street on the south. A steep embankment abuts the building on the north side. The neighborhood surrounding the State House consists mainly of state office buildings and some residential housing. The Supreme Court building and the Pavilion Office Building, which houses the Executive branch of the State government, to include the Governor's office, is located on the southeast corner of the property.

The building is situated on the north side of the property with public parking lots for legislators on the east and west sides. Governor Aiken Avenue, running north/south from State Street, and, Baldwin Street running east/west, lead to the parking lots from the east. Governor Davis Avenue, running north/south, and, Court Street, running east/west, lead to the parking lots from the west.

RECOMMENDATION #1:
Limit parking to state legislators and staff.

RECOMMENDATION #2:
Issue parking decals to all State government employees.

There is no fencing around the property. Pedestrian traffic within the complex and surrounding areas is free flowing and unrestricted.

RECOMMENDATION #3:
Erect a fence running east to west on the north side of the property, adjacent to the rear of the State House, to act as a barrier/deterrent for the rear of the building.



There is currently a minimal amount of exterior lighting that consists of floodlights on the building, and streetlights from the adjacent streets.

RECOMMENDATION #4:
Increase lighting in the complex for video assessment and improved illumination in areas of heavy foliage.

There is currently no security system in place at the State House.

RECOMMENDATION #5:
Install an outer perimeter alarm system to provide early notification of intrusion in areas that are not actively patrolled by security personnel. Numerous types of technologies (e.g., microwave, infrared, ported coax cable, fiber optics, etc.) are available on the open market to accomplish this. All alarms should read-out directly to the Command Post.

RECOMMENDATION #6:
Install a middle perimeter alarm system to detect any activity close to the building after hours. All alarms should read-out directly to the Command Post.

RECOMMENDATION #7:
Alarm all exterior doors and windows. All alarms should read-out directly to the Command Post.

RECOMMENDATION #8:
Install cameras to view the State House and surrounding areas. These cameras should be used to provide surveillance of the outer perimeter, video assessment of perimeter alarms, and observation of perimeter posts. Recommendations for the placement of these cameras will be addressed in the Technical Security section of this report.

Pedestrians are granted full and unchallenged access to the grounds, buildings and parking facilities located on the State House complex. There are a number of exterior doors that are functional from both the interior and exterior and are utilized throughout the year. Some doors are seldom opened and the average occupant of the State House is probably not even aware of their location. All entrance doors are available for use by employees, visitors, and the general public, although visitors primarily use the main entrance and the legislators and staff use the entrances on the east and west sides, adjacent to the parking lots. There currently are no restrictions for access to any doors within the building.

RECOMMENDATION #9:
Designate specific doors as entry/exit doors and close the rest for emergency egress only.

RECOMMENDATION #10:
Install local audible alarm crash bars on all designated emergency egress doors and remove the door handles from the exterior of these doors.

RECOMMENDATION #11:

Limit access to the State House to two entrances, the main entrance and the west handicap entrance.



RECOMMENDATION #12:

Designate one specific entry/exit point for the general public, visitors and guests.

The general public has unrestricted access within the State House.

RECOMMENDATION #13:

Restrict free public access throughout the State House. Visitors to the State House should be required to remain in the designated general public areas.

There is a metal door leading to the stairwell that provides access to the dome area that is not alarmed.

RECOMMENDATION #14:
Alarm the door. All alarms should read-out directly to the Command Post.

The lift-up door in the floor, and all tunnel access doors in the east courtyard area, the east end basement area, and the bomb shelter areas are not locked nor alarmed.

RECOMMENDATION #15:
Lock and alarm these doors. All alarms should read-out directly to the Command Post.

The door to the fire hose hook-up area, on the west-side ground level of the building, is not alarmed. Currently, a plywood sheet is installed over the window by building engineers.

RECOMMENDATION #16:
Install a metal door to the fire hose hook-up area. Install a high-security lock and alarm. The alarm should read-out directly to the Command Post.

RECOMMENDATION #17:
Replace the plywood in the window with appropriate glass. Alarm the window. The alarm should read-out directly to the Command Post.

The telephone frame room is equipped with a lock, however, the door is always left unlocked. This room contains fiber optic cable that carries the building's data transmissions.

RECOMMENDATION #18:
Lock and alarm the door. The alarm should read-out directly to the Command Post.

There is a room located near the infirmary where telephone lines come into the building. The room also houses the door controller main panel. At the time of this survey, the door was left unlocked. Cleaning carts and boxes were being stored in the room

RECOMMENDATION #19:
Keep the door to the telephone cable room locked at all times.

RECOMMENDATION #20:
Remove the cleaning carts and boxes.

The elevator control room near the infirmary was not locked.

RECOMMENDATION #21:
Keep the door to the elevator control room locked at all times.

OPERATIONS

The Vermont State Legislature is in session each year from the beginning of January through the end of April or beginning of May. The State House is usually open for self-guided tours from the end of June through October, during business hours, Monday through Saturday, and, in the winter months, during business hours, Monday through Friday.

Guided tours are given from the end of June through the middle of October, during business hours, Monday through Saturday.

It is the current policy of the Vermont State Legislature, set forth by the Vermont State Constitution (section 8) that:

> *"The doors of the House in which the General Assembly of this Commonwealth shall sit, shall be open for the admission of all persons who behave decently, except only when the welfare of the State may require them to be shut."*

The current operation of the State House is such that any person may enter from any entrance, and walk virtually anywhere in the building unescorted. In addition there is currently no screening of packages or mail.

RECOMMENDATION #22:

Establish a security post at the main entrance and the west handicapped entrance. Equip each post with a screening area, a house phone, a walk-through magnetometer, a belt driven x-ray machine, a surveillance camera and a duress "panic" alarm. The camera and alarm should read-out directly to the central security office. Staff/employees should pass unimpeded through these checkpoints after displaying their photographic identification pass. All visitors/non-passholders would be directed to the screening area where they will be issued temporary passes, required to pass through the magnetometer and have their packages screened through the x-ray machine.

PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY IDENTIFICATION

All employees are issued a photographic identification pass, but are not required to wear the pass or carry it with them. Currently the only employees that wear their identification pass are the maintenance staff.

RECOMMENDATION #23:
Require all staff/employees to wear/display their photographic identification passes at all times.

RECOMMENDATION #24:
Require all individuals requiring access to the House and Senate floors during sessions to display their identification badge prior to admittance.

Currently, there are no policies or procedures in place for the issuance of contractor/visitor/temporary identification.

RECOMMENDATION #25:
Develop policies and procedures for a temporary identification system.

RECOMMENDATION #26:
Develop temporary identification with specific expiration dates for non-employees.

RECOMMENDATION #27:
Issue a disposable visitor sticker to be worn by all visitors, to include tour participants, while in the State House.

RECOMMENDATION #28:
Require escorts for contractors/visitors that need access to sensitive/restricted areas of the State House.

PERSONNEL SCREENING

There is no policy for pre-employment screening of employees/contractors or conducting background investigations.

RECOMMENDATION #29:
Require all full time, part time, and contract employees and vendors be subject to security/background checks.

RECOMMENDATION #30:
Conduct limited background investigations (e.g., criminal records checks) on contractors and other regular visitors to the complex.

RECOMMENDATION #31:
Minimum standards for employment should be established by the House and Senate leadership.

RECOMMENDATION #32:
Require background investigations for all non-elected personnel to include NCIC, CCH, credit history and FBI records checks.

RECOMMENDATION #33:
Establish a database, that is maintained by the security force, containing employee and contractor information.

RECOMMENDATION #34:
Conduct periodic reinvestigations at a minimum of, every five (5) years.

RECOMMENDATION #35:
Designate an entity within the State House for employees to report any criminal arrests.

Emergency Procedures

The current emergency procedures in place are very minimal, mainly consisting of a contract security firm which generally work from 4:00pm through 8:00am. The primary mission is a "Fire watch", and monitoring parking when the legislators are in session.

Fire evacuation plans currently exist for the State House, however, distribution and posting is limited.

RECOMMENDATION #36:
Written evacuation plans need to be distributed throughout the complex with floor monitors designated to supervise the evacuation of employees in the event of a fire, bomb threat, or other disaster. These monitors should review the evacuation plans on a periodic basis.

RECOMMENDATION #37:
Implement a standardized bomb threat form and distribute it to all employees with instructions on notification to proper authorities.

RECOMMENDATION #38:
Develop and implement a plan for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) response to the State House in the event a suspicious package is received.

TECHNICAL SECURITY

Security systems and devices enhance the overall physical security environment by combining specialized technical equipment and specific physical security procedures. Technical security systems are not intended to replace manpower, but rather enhance the utilization of security personnel.

Many technical security systems can be implemented and made aesthetically pleasing. In most cases the casual observer will not know a technical security system is present. Although physical security systems can be costly, they provide an improved security environment that may not be available through any other means.

RECOMMENDATION #39:

Install duress "panic" alarm devices in the House and Senate Chambers, the Governor's office, the Governor's receptionist's area, the Lt. Governor's office, and the Lt. Governor's receptionist's area. The alarms should read-out directly to the Command Post.

RECOMMENDATION #40:

Lock and alarm all entrances to the roof, basement, utility areas and utility tunnels. All alarms should read-out directly to the Command Post.



There are no physical barriers in place between the House and Senate floors and their respective galleries.

RECOMMENDATION #41:
Install a physical barrier between the House and Senate floors and their respective galleries. This barrier does not have to completely isolate the public from the representatives but should provide an obstacle or obstruction from a direct path of contact.

Command control and display security systems combine all functions, both hardware and software, of alarms systems, lighting controls, access control, video assessment systems, condition display maps and event documentation into a single controller. In addition to combining all of the above, today's systems can also interface with fire control panels for monitoring purposes only and perform other administrative functions such as scheduling and time cards.

Based on user defined parameters, the controller initiates multiple operations from a single event such as a key stroke on the system controller, a change of time or date, a breech of security, or a holiday. With each "event" a series of operations is initiated by the system control. Lights can be turned on and off, doors locked, alarms secured and accessed, video assessment systems enabled and disabled, all with little or no human interface.

RECOMMENDATION #42:
Provide the security force with a Command Post, in lieu of the Sergeant-at-Arms office. This Command Post should consist of all monitoring and safety equipment deemed appropriate. All facility alarms and cameras should read-out directly to the Command Post.

RECOMMENDATION #43:
Implement a periodic training program for the officers on the operation and maintenance of the security systems.

RECOMMENDATION #44:
Install 24-hour point contact alarms on all exterior doors and windows. These alarms should read-out directly to the Command Post.

RECOMMENDATION #45:
Install permanent radio communication, to include a base station, providing communication to the Montpelier Police Department, the Washington County Sheriffs Department, and the Vermont State Police.

Closed Circut Television (CCTV)

Video cameras are positioned and deployed to serve two basic functions in a secure environment: the first is video assessment of a penetrated alarm point (i.e., to allow observation of a very specific area with a fixed camera and lens with a specific focal point and focus). The second function is to use a camera for investigative/observation purposes. In order to perform the second function, pan/tilt/zoom controlled cameras are installed to monitor a large area and follow events within the secured environment without security personnel leaving their assigned post of duty.

RECOMMENDATION #46:

Purchase and install a video switcher/controller manufactured by Burle, American Dynamics, Javelin, or a similar company, which has the capability of a video matrix equal to or greater than a 48 camera input by 8 monitor output. This controller must be able to communicate with the host alarm computer and be capable of initiating a video recording device.

The video controller installed must be capable of operating pan/tilt/zoom units and directing these units to pre-programmed focal and lens points for alarm verification.

Today's technology has allowed pan/tilt/zoom cameras to do the job of overall surveillance and close point monitoring. Because of this motor speed and lens flexibility, one pan/tilt/zoom camera can monitor the same area as several fixed lens cameras. Because of this flexibility, use of the more expensive pan/tilt/zoom cameras, where applicable, is actually more cost effective. In many applications, such as entryways and window observation, the fixed lens camera is the best video alternative.

RECOMMENDATION #47:

Install pan/tilt/zoom cameras on each of the corners of the roof of the State House. Each of these cameras will have multiple viewing responsibilities. Each unit will have several location presets loaded for alarm call up response, but the majority of the camera functions will be general observation of the surrounding area. Due to the enormous viewing area that each camera will be responsible for,

○ Camera Location

the physical placement of the camera installation is critical. Each unit is responsible for over a 270 degree viewing area and therefore would protrude from the roof. If, due to historical or aesthetic reasons, these units cannot be located where necessary, then other locations using more cameras and expensive alternative technologies may be substituted.

RECOMMENDATION #48:

In addition, install cameras in the following locations:



- An exterior camera should be installed at the west-side, handicapped entrance viewing both entrance doors.

- An exterior camera should be installed at the east-side, entrance viewing both entrance doors.

- An interior camera should be installed in the interior lobby of the main entrance viewing the entire lobby area and entrance doors.

RECOMMENDATION #49:

Equip the exterior cameras with heaters and enclose in weather-proof housings.

Fire Systems

A wet/dry fire sprinkler system is installed within the State House. However, this system is not installed in the House and Senate Chambers, the Governor's office, the Cedar Creek room, the main state building's restored historic areas, and the foyers and connecting hallways. Smoke and heat rise detectors are installed within the building. A Simplex annunciation panel is located near the west side, handicapped entrance. The panel is wired directly to the fire department who automatically responds when the panel sends an alarm. Engineers conduct maintenance and testing of the fire sprinkler system, to include testing the sprinklers and strobe/horns. Fire extinguishers are checked annually be the engineers and recharged locally.

RECOMMENDATION #50:
Install a fire sprinkler system in the House and Senate Chambers, the Governor's office, the Cedar Creek room, the main state building's restored historic areas, and the foyers and connecting hallways.

Emergency Power

The building is equipped with a six cylinder, 30KW, 37.5 KVA emergency generator. Automatic switch over to emergency power takes less than one minute. The emergency generator services the emergency and fire lighting, however, the engineers are not certain what other power needs are serviced by the generator. Building engineers perform general maintenance on the generator, and contact Brookfield Services for major problems. A test load of the generator is performed every two weeks by the engineers and is maintained in record log.

RECOMMENDATION #51:
Engineers should determine and document all systems that are currently wired to the emergency generator. At minimum, 10% of all interior lighting fixtures should be illuminated by the generator.

RECOMMENDATIN #52:
Perform an engineering study to identify current emergency power requirements and additional power requirements for the recommended security system, all life safety systems, and the interior/exterior emergency lighting fixtures.

RECOMMENDATION #53:
All security systems and communication systems require 100% power back-up. In addition, all control room equipment must be connected to an uninterrupted power supply system which will bridge and filter power fluctuations.

Magnetometer and X-Ray Screening

Magnetometers and x-ray machines are used as security aids for weapons and explosives detection.

RECOMMENDATION #54:
Install a permanent, walk-through magnetometer, such as the Outokumpu Metor 120, or similar magnetometer, at the west side, handicapped entrance.

RECOMMENDATION #55:
Purchase two (2) portable, walk-through magnetometers, such as CHIA, or a similar magnetometer. Utilize one (1) of the portable magnetometers at the main entrance in order to provide security screening without detracting from the historical appearance of the lobby. The second portable magnetometer should be used as a spare, or when needed during large events, to insure pedestrian traffic flow remains constant.

RECOMMENDATION #56:
Purchase one (1) hand-held magnetometer in support of each walk-through magnetometer.

RECOMMENDATION #57:
Provide security officers with proper training on the calibration and operation of the magnetometers.

RECOMMENDATION #58:

Option A:
Install an x-ray machine at both the main lobby entrance and the west side, handicapped entrance. The Microscan Portable Micro-Focus X-Ray system, or a similar system, is a viable alternative to installing permanent, x-ray systems.

Option B:
Install magnetometers at the west-side handicapped entrance and require all visitors carrying packages to enter the building through this entrance.

SECURITY FORCE

The Sergeant-at-Arms administers security for the State House. Vermont State Statute, Title Two, sets forth the basic authority of the Sergeant-at-Arms. As set forth in Title Two, Section 61:

> *"A Sergeant-at-Arms shall be elected bi-annually by the Senate and House of Representatives in joint assembly."*

The legislative duties of the Sergeant-at-Arms are set forth in Title Two, Section 62a, which includes, but are not limited to:

> *"Executing Orders of either house"; and "Maintain order among spectators and take measure to prevent interruption of either house or any committee thereof."*

Further, Title Two, Section 64a, reads:

> *"The Sergeant-at-Arms may, subject to the rules of the general assembly, employ such employees as may be needed to carry out the sergeant at arms' duties. These may include assistants, custodians, doorkeepers, guides, messengers, mail and room assignment clerks, security guards and pages..."*

Currently there is one security officer for the State House who works directly under the control of the Sergeant-of-Arms. The Vermont State Constitution and legislature do not provide any special law enforcement authority for the security officer. His authority is that granted all citizens under common law. Currently, the incumbent security officer is a former Washington County Deputy Sheriff, who has, through the Washington County Sheriff's Department, been granted status as a special Deputy Sheriff (24 V.S.A. #307). He currently wears a Deputy Sheriff's uniform and is granted arrest powers and weapons carrying status through this temporary appointment. His duties include protection of persons and property in and around the State House.

"Doorkeepers," with no law enforcement authority, assist the security officer. Their primary duties are to control access and behavior within the House and Senate chambers. Additionally they sort mail and operate the legislative post office. Doorkeepers only work while the House or Senate are in session.

RECOMMENDATION #59:
Hire additional security officers to provide 24 hour, seven day a week coverage, with a minimum of two (2) officers per shift.

RECOMMENDATION #60:

Provide security officers with full statutory law enforcement authority, afforded to all other police departments in the state. This would necessitate that security officers attend the Vermont Criminal Justice Academy, which would provide standard training and qualifications as all other state law enforcement officers receive.

RECOMMENDATION #61:

Consideration should be given to placing security of the State House, the Supreme Court building and the Pavilion Office building under the control of the Vermont State Police. This would be beneficial since the State Police already have existing security in place for the Governor's office. This would also minimize the legislative, administrative and financial expense of starting a new State House Police force.

SUMMARY

The focus of this survey was to apply a security philosophy that would encompass the entire complex. The survey team did not attempt to address the exact specifications or details for each proposed recommendation. The recommendations contained in this survey represent the ideal situation and provide a standard for comparison for the level of security that budget and personnel concerns dictate.

An effective security plan requires not only the coordination of personnel and resources, it also requires compliance by those it is meant to protect. In order to be effective, any security plan must be periodically reviewed and re-assessed, not only by security managers, but also, by the legislature which may have to draft laws in the future to support and enhance security.

The United States Secret Service firmly believes in the importance of cooperation among law enforcement agencies and recognizes that our objectives are primarily the same and that cooperation is necessary to achieve these objectives. This survey is another example of the cooperation that exists between the United States Secret Service and our associates in state legislature and law enforcement.